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Relationship Banking, Governance and SME’s Performance:  
The Portuguese Evidence  
 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this work is to analyze how bank relationships, corporate governance and the 
interdependence that is established between them, affect corporate performance, based on a 
sample of 5,900 Portuguese SMEs. The banks and the enterprises establish relationships which 
enable them to overcome problems of asymmetrical information thereby overcoming difficulties felt in 
obtaining financial resources. In addition, the specificities that SMEs face, namely their ownership 
structure, as they are often owned and controlled by families, lead us to study the role played by 
corporate governance and the various control mechanisms in achieving corporate objectives. These 
features confer an important supervisory role on credit institutions. 
 
KEY WORDS: Bank Relationships, Corporate Governance, Performance. 
 
 
RESUMO 
Este trabalho tem por objectivo analisar o modo como as relações bancárias, o governo da empresa e a 
interdependência que se estabelece entre estas, condicionam o desempenho empresarial, tendo por 
base uma amostra de 5.900 PME’s portuguesas. Os bancos e as empresas estabelecem relações que 
permitem superar problemas de assimetria de informação aliviando, desse modo, as dificuldades 
sentidas na obtenção de recursos financeiros. Paralelamente, as especificidades que estas empresas 
encerram, nomeadamente a natureza familiar que a estrutura de propriedade e controlo lhes confere, 
remetem-nos para o estudo do papel exercido pelo governo da empresa e dos diferentes mecanismos 
de controlo, no cumprimento dos propósitos empresariais. Estas dimensões reservam às instituições de 
crédito, um importante papel de supervisão. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Relação Bancária, Governo da Empresa, Desempenho. 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been the object of numerous studies for 
their capacity to generate work and for the role they play as creators of wealth. In market systems, 
issues of survival, the complexity and dynamism of the business environment require an increasingly 
deepened understanding of organizations as well as the variables or factors that become key elements 
in their performance.  
 
Many authors are unanimous in stressing the internal factors which influence corporate performance 
highlighting: bank relationships (Degryse and Ongema, 2001; Ongema and Smith, 2001), corporate 
governance (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), human resources (Rogoff, Lee and Suh, 2004) marketing 
(Kara,Spillan and Deshields, 2005), quality, innovation and technological resources (Donovan, 1996), 
cultural values and information’s systems (Tse and Soufani, 2003). This study addresses the first two 
of these. 
 
The difficulties SMEs feel in obtaining financial resources together with the scant possibility of access 
to capital markets means that the credit market constitutes their main source of funding. For this 
reason, studying bank intermediation becomes particular relevance particularly when assessing the 
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contribution of the company’s performance of the (Boot, 2000). Relationships with their creditors play 
a particularly important role for companies subject to greater information asymmetry.  
 
In addition, these companies have witnessed the transformation processes that are characterized by: i) 
a growing separation between ownership and management and ii) their capital being opened up to 
outside investors. This places them in a new paradigm which translates into the need to assess how the 
company’s governance conditions its performance. As Denis and McConnel (2003) have said this 
revolves around two main streams of research: i) one concerned with the variables related to 
ownership structure and ii) the other highlighting the more institutional aspects such as those 
connected to the Board and the Director General.  
 
In the European institutional context, we are also witnessing greater involvement of financial 
institutions within companies, both as creditors and shareholders, and as participants in management 
bodies (Byers, et al. 2008). 
 
Specificities which are inherent to SMEs – in terms of information asymmetry, the value of 
information produced and at times conflicting interests between management, creditors and 
shareholders – attribute a determinant role in understanding business performance to bank 
relationships.  
 
The aim of this work is to analyze the interdependence between bank relationships, corporate 
governance and performance in the context of Portuguese SMEs. To this end it is organized thusly: the 
importance of bank relationships and governance in performance is reviewed in the next section; in 
section 3 the hypotheses to be tested are formulated; section 4 presents the methodology, sample and 
variables used; section 5 presents the main results obtained and finally, the main conclusions and 
limitations of this study are discussed in section 6 as well as suggestions for future work. 
 
 
2. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE  
 
The question of the bank relationship constitutes a complex but essential topic when one wants to 
analyze companies’ financial performance insofar as this conditions the terms of their funding. 
 
The bank relationship is usually associated with the informational relationship which is established 
between the bank and the customer (especially credit customers), influencing the contractual terms 
proposed for the various banking products and services either acquired or to be acquired. Boot (2000, 
p.10) defines the bank relationship as “the provision of banking/financial services to the customer 
(company) by a bank (financial intermediary) which invests in the gathering of specific information 
(private information) to assess its profitability, taking multiple interactions over time into 
consideration”. Degryse and Ongena (2007) say that banks as the main creditors reduce information 
asymmetries, signalling the quality of the company to the market. They increase availability of credit 
and simultaneously play a disciplinary role with managers, keeping them from executing unviable 
projects. The exchange of information that stems from the bank relationship has a high degree of 
privacy, which is fruit of the trust established (Groessl and Levratto, 2004). In turn, this results in a 
learning process marked by positive experiences which the parties in the credit contract go through. 
This helps to reduce the climate of uncertainty surrounding the relationship.  
 
The solidness of the relationship is evaluated from the following dimensions: the duration of the 
relationship, the extension of services acquired and the number of bank relationships. 
 
The measure that is most widely used is duration of the relationship which is the length of time the 
relationship lasts from its beginning. The importance of this dimension is that it reflects private 
information accumulated by the creditor throughout various periods of time. This information is 
difficult to transfer outside of the relationship. According to Ongena and Smith (2001), as the 
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relationship is established, the credit institution may observe, learn and use private information on its 
customers. This, in turn, is determinant in celebrating new contracts. From the perspective of the 
company, this is synonymous with duly servicing the debt, the viability of the project and solvency of 
its promoter.  
 
The second dimension is amplitude (the extension of services acquired). Ongena and Smith (2001, p. 
452), define it by the quantity of services the bank offers and the company uses. The interaction of the 
customer with various financial products provides the bank greater rigour and efficiency in the 
information obtained. In conceding various financial products/service, the bank is able to introduce 
greater contractual flexibility, set pricing policies as a function of the different services and discern 
more about the repayment capacity of the company. The range of banking products purchased may 
condition granting credit in various ways: i) it increases the information the bank has on the company, 
ii) the bank may dilute the fixed costs of collecting and processing information over a wider range of 
products and services (Bornheim and Herbeck, 1998).  
 
Finally, the other variable used is the number of simultaneous bank relationships that the company 
establishes. Bank relationships may be classified, according to the number of stakeholders, as bilateral 
(the company and a bank) and multilateral (the company and various banks). For Diamond (1984), 
bilateral relationships give the creditor bank the greatest incentive to supervise the company’s 
activities and enable the duplication of vigilance and control to be eliminated. Nevertheless, this 
relationship confers upon the bank an information monopoly which may be used for its own benefit, 
conditioning the investment decisions of the company (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). Anticipating these 
problems (the hold-up problem), companies have an incentive to establish multilateral connections.  
 
The bank relationship fosters the production and sharing of information dispensing with, in many 
circumstances, pre-assessment regarding their credibility. The presence of information asymmetry in 
the bank relationship creates problems, the solutions of which entails costs, called agency costs, 
particularly felt when proponents of credit are small and/or tend to be opaque as is the case with SMEs 
(Psillaki, 1995). 
 
The bank relationship provides benefits to stakeholders insofar as it develops confidentiality, improves 
negotiating flexibility, reduces agency problems and allows a reputable image to be built and 
consolidated (Cánovas and Solano, 2006). However, there are disadvantages as well, including when 
the benefits of the relationship are not shared equitably. Those which stem from appropriating 
benefits, whether on the part of companies (the bank has an incentive to concede more credit than the 
true risk level of the company can support – the soft budgeting problem), whether on the part of the 
banks (who take advantage of the fact that the company is “tied up” informationally in order to impose 
higher prices – the hold-up problem) (Sharpe, 1990 and Rajan, 1992). 
 
Taking agency theory as the conceptual watermark, this work also intends to assess in the light of 
existing research, how the various mechanisms of corporate governance and the interaction established 
between these mechanisms condition performance.  
 
The separation between ownership and control generates conflicts of interests between investors 
(shareholders and creditors) and administrators. Thus, the need arises to implement internal and 
external control mechanisms that harmonize the various interests given the impossibility of celebrating 
complete contracts1 (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Investors provide financial resources that need 
to be remunerated and the company should implement a set of mechanisms that inhibit privileges to be 
obtained by some stakeholders over others (Prowse, 1995). The dominant perspective in the literature 
on this issue focuses its attention on the conflict of interests between investors (property owners) and 
administrators (who control and use the resources) and, consequently, the inefficiencies that arise 
                                                            
1 The complete contract collects all of the obligations of the parties in the contractual relationship, before any 
eventuality and penalizes whoever does not comply with them. The impossibility of defining all contingencies 
and the costs associated with the preparation of such a contract give rise to incomplete contracts. 
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therein. The absence of conflict occurs when ownership and the power to take decision fall on a single 
person. When this does not happen, corporate governance and its instruments are limited to the 
relationship established between investors and administrators, whose decisions condition returns 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
The impossibility of celebrating complete contracts may give rise to the discretionary directive. 
Agreements between the administration and investors contemplate in general what to do with the 
resources affected to the company and the income generated.  
 
These problems of the discretionary directive lead to governance mechanisms being established 
through which investors can assure their income. Nevertheless, these mechanisms do not always work 
in such a way as to satisfy the interests of all of the shareholders or to guarantee maximizing the value 
of the company. Therein lies the need for the corporate government to associate itself with the legal 
instruments and effective control mechanisms so as to safeguard against expropriation of minority 
shareholders (Johnson, et al. 2000). 
 
It has been difficult to obtain a consensus on the concept of “the company’s government,” which is 
probably a symptom of its complexity and scope. Nevertheless, the idea remains that there is a sharing 
of power and that the results between the various parties whose interests do not always coincide.  
 
The literature on the company’s government, has given importance to contractual problems among 
shareholders and directors as well as to the study of mechanisms available to investors to control their 
resources and minimize conflicts of interest. However, work carried out on concentration of ownership 
has been giving a new focus to the agency theory: it displaces the main/agent relationship to the 
connection between majority and minority shareholders where expropriation of “private benefits”2 
assumes a crucial role, which provokes a conflict of interests (Gregoric and Vespro, 2003). 
 
The object of the literature that has been produced in this area has been large companies. However, 
within corporate finance SMEs have gained growing importance due to the features they entail. 
Among these emphasis is on the family nature that the ownership structure and control confers upon 
them. This means that contractual relationships which are established in the company contemplate 
family ties besides and beyond economic ties.  
 
The relationship between the banking system and the company’s government has been raising growing 
interest in corporate finance. The European institutional context is propitious to financial entities 
playing different roles in companies both as creditors and shareholders and participants in the 
management bodies (Byers et al., 2008).  
 
In a context marked by information asymmetries, the literature has questioned the role played by 
participation of banks in corporate performance. Even though a broad consensus can be found in 
theoretical work that highlight improved efficiency, the question remains open as to whether this 
translates into higher corporate profitability or rather, if it reverts back to the bank through 
expropriation of private benefits (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998).  
 
We may conclude by stating that participation of banks in the ownership structure is a multifaceted 
reality, where opportunities and the limitations they occasion are not necessarily symmetrical for both 
parts. The characteristics of each country’s legal system, the structure of the financial system, the 
relative weight of the capital market and good banking practices vary in each case and may provoke 
significant differences in the effects of the relationship between banks and companies. 
 
 
 
                                                            
2 “Private benefits” result from the majority shareholder using his control power to obtain a fraction of the 
residual benefits that go beyond the part that his equity confers upon him. 
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3. HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED 
 
The theory on bank intermediation gives bank relationships a crucial role in reducing information 
asymmetry. Companies may reduce problems of information, establishing strict relationships with 
banks, and in turn, invest in collecting and analyzing their customers’ information. The proximity and 
repeated interactions over time may be beneficial for the company insofar as they allow it to greater 
availability of credit and better contractual conditions.  
 
The exclusivity of the bank relationship increases investment in reciprocity of information and reduces 
duplication of costs thereby contributing to maximizing the company’s value (relationship hypothesis). 
Nevertheless, the exclusive relationship grants monopoly power to the bank, giving it an incentive to 
practice opportunistic behaviour (hold-up hypothesis). The other side of the coin, the multilateral 
relationship, reduces the hold-up problem, but also reduces incentives to intensify the relationship. 
 
One of the aims of this work is to assess the importance to attribute to each of the previous hypotheses 
to corporate performance, expressed thus: 
 
H1: The relationship between the company and the financial institution may improve corporate 
performance.  
 
Among the actions that the company can develop to improve its performance, the continuity of the 
relationship the company has with the financial institution is highlighted. A review of the literature 
on this says the same can be measured by instrumental variables such as: the number of financial 
entities the company habitually works with, the duration of the relationship or the amplitude of the 
financial services contracted with the financial institution. Given the data available, only the first two 
relationships will be tested in the following hypotheses: 
 
H11: The number of financial institutions with which the company works is negatively related to its 
performance. 
 
There are contradictory propositions surrounding this hypothesis. On the one hand, a reduced 
number of financial entities, or in an extreme situation – a single bank, allows information 
asymmetries and funding costs to be reduced and facilitates access to credit (Degryse and Ongena, 
2001). On the other hand, there are arguments which defend that the benefits of competition among 
the various financial entities greatly outweigh the advantages defined above (Weinstein and Yafeh, 
1998, Agarwal and Elston, 2001).  
 
H12: The duration of the bank relationship conditions the company’s performance positively.  
 
This assertion stems from the fact that a stable relationship gives the parties greater mutual 
understanding and consequently lower constraints in funding. The relationship allows value to be 
created to the extent that supervision and control costs decrease. The credit institution may transfer 
part of this to the company, reducing the cost of funding (Athavale and Edmister, 2004, De Bodt et 
al., 2005). 
 
With regard to corporate governance concentration of ownership appears as a natural mechanism for 
monitoring the operations of company directors. The shareholders with a significant participation are 
willing to assume this responsibility whenever the expected benefits are greater than the costs arising 
from the exercise. The influence of the shareholder structure on corporate performance is conditioned 
by the amplitude of the conflicts of interests between majority shareholders and the directors of the 
company in which they participate as well as between the various investors who comprise the 
company’s equity. In the continental model (where the majority shareholder is a family, industrial or 
financial group) conflicts of interest are greater than those found in the Anglo-Saxon model, where 
investors (investment funds, pensions or insurance companies) have lower conflicts of interests with 
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the company they participate in. Nevertheless, the problem of supervision remains, particularly in the 
presence of private information. 
 
As for concentration of ownership and the positive effect it may generate in corporate performance, 
some authors defend greater dispersion arguing that concentration of ownership not only reduces 
liquidity but also increases: i) the discretionary directive (Burkart and Panunzi, 2006), ii) the risk 
assumed by the majority investor and iii) private benefits obtained through expropriating the wealth of 
minority shareholders.  
 
Obtaining private benefits allows the expropriation hypothesis to be formulated whereby majority 
shareholders use their control power to condition the decisions of the board orienting them to their 
own benefit. Nevertheless, it does not exclude the property supervision hypothesis from being 
complied with simultaneously, contributing to reducing the discretionary directive and adopting 
correct strategies. However, concentration of ownership gives rise to costs which may cancel out the 
public benefits stemming from supervision. 
 
Thus, the relationship between concentration of ownership, identity of the majority shareholder and 
corporate performance turn into an empirical question the result of which depends on the equilibrium 
between public benefits which result in greater supervision of private interests which motivate the 
majority investor and the degree of conflicts of interest between shareholders and directors enable the 
company’s value to be maximized. 
 
In this context the following hypotheses are formulated: 
 
H2: The mechanisms of governance condition corporate performance.  
 
Ownership structure and the characteristics of the board of directors constitute pillars through which 
corporate governance condition performance. 
 
H21: The ownership structure of the company is positively related to corporate performance. 
 
The ownership structure of the company conditions corporate performance, taking into account the 
equilibrium between private benefits that the majority shareholder can obtain (which vary as a 
function of his identity), the public benefits which result from a certain shareholder structure (which 
translate into greater/lesser supervision and alignment of interests) and costs associated with the level 
of concentration of. The ownership structure aggregates three distinct dimensions: 
- The identity of the shareholder (family member, institutional, bank…): the family nature of 
ownership creates greater performance as a consequence of the convergence of interests between 
shareholders and directors; 
- Concentration of ownership: if private benefits outweigh public benefits, there is a negative impact 
on performance; 
- Participation of the directors in the company’s equity: this participation provides a means to obtain 
private benefits, conditioning performance negatively. 
 
H22: The characteristics of the board of directors conditions corporate performance positively. 
 
The revision of the literature enables us to identify the main characteristics of the board of directors 
as: its nature (internal/external) and size (Dalton et al., 1998; Daily et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the 
availability of data allows us to test the relevance of the shareholders who participate in the board 
and its size. The coincidence of roles (shareholder and administrator) calls on contradictory effects 
which stem from the expropriation hypothesis and the efficient supervision hypothesis. The idea of 
obtaining private benefits prevails which leads to an expectation of a negative impact on 
performance. In turn, the efficiency of the administration in its vigilance and supervision functions is 
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evaluated by its size. Communication and coordination problems inherent to this collective decision-
making body are reduced to the extent that they reduce the number of participants. Therefore, greater 
efficiency in supervision is expected as its size decreases. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY, SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
4.1. PROPOSED MODEL  
 
The aim of this research is to demonstrate the explicative power of a set of independent variables 
which characterize bank relationships and corporate governance on corporate performance in a sample 
of Portuguese SMEs using a multiple regression model. 
 
Based on the revision of the literature and given the hypotheses to be tested, we formulated the 
following model:  
 
Y = β0 + β1 No. of banks + β2 Duration + β3 Rel. Increase + β4 Rel .maintain + β5 Shareholder size + 
β6 Family + β7 Industrial + β8 Financial + β9 Concentration + β10 Internal owner. + β11 Size of 
Board + β12 Nature of Board + β13 Micro + β14 Small + β15 Reputation + β16 Financial Struct. + 
β17 Bank Debt + ε 
 
Where: 
    Variables    Definition 
Performance  
      ROA Operating income / assets  
      EVB Volume of business / number of workers 
Bank Relationship  
     No. of Banks Number of bank entities in 2007 
     Duration Number of common bank entities (2003 and 2007) / Number 
of bank entities in 2007 
     Rel. increase Number of bank entities for the period under study increased 
    Rel. maintain Number of bank entities for the period under study did not 
change 
Corporate Governance  
     Shareholder size Number of Shareholders  
     Family Family nature of ownership. Percentage of participation in 
shareholder structure 
     Industrial Industrial nature of ownership. Percentage of participation in 
shareholder structure 
     Financial Financial nature of ownership. Percentage of participation in 
shareholder structure 
      
     Concentration Herfindalh Index, calculated thus: ∑
=
=
n
i
iPH
1
2   
     Internal owner. Owned by who holds active management positions / total 
ownership. 
     Size of Board Number of board members 
     Nature of Board Number of shareholders who hold management positions 
Control  
      Micro Classified by Decree-Law no. 372/2007 as a micro company  
      Small Classified by Decree-Law no. 372/2007 as a small company  
      Reputation Age of the company 
      Financial Struct. Liabilities / equities 
      Bank Debt Bank liabilities / liabilities 
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4.2. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
Choosing SMEs as the object of study is owing to their having a particular set of characteristics that 
set them off from the rest. Firstly they are subject to bigger informational problems in the financial 
market. Therefore, the value of the bank relationship based on reciprocity of soft information takes on 
particular relevance. Smaller and younger companies as well as those which are informationally 
opaque because they do not have a credit history and in the impossibility of credibly disclosing their 
quality associated with the absence of a separation between ownership and management, information 
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders increase considerably. Secondly, small companies are 
limited with regards to obtaining external resources from financial institutions in that only large 
companies have access to the debt market. Thirdly, these companies are particularly relevant in our 
corporate context. They represent 99.6% of the corporate units in the country, creating 75.2% of the 
jobs and representing over half of the business volume (56.4%). They are extremely important in any 
of the sectors but are especially relevant in tourism and construction, in contrast with the energy sector 
where their role is felt less (IAPMEI, 2008). 
 
The main source of information is SABI (Iberian System of Balance Sheets Analysis) which contain 
accounting and financial information on Portuguese and Spanish companies. The universe of 
Portuguese companies in the database (version 33.1, update 110 – October 2008) is 332 743. It is 
possible to obtain accounting information from 255 770. Because one of the concerns of this study is 
the impact of bank relationships on performance and given the unavailability to obtain data which 
allow us to ascertain duration, we adopted the procedure of identifying in distinct moments (2003 and 
2007) the credit institutions with which the company had relationships. Through this procedure it is 
possible to determine the number of credit institutions with whom the relationship is equal to or lower 
than 4 years. 
 
The need to restrict the sample to companies which have a set of requirements – in terms of their size 
(number of workers, volume of business, assets), of their equity and information on banks and 
ownership – means that filters are introduced into the sample. The following table presents the filters 
introduced the criteria used and the number of companies selected. 
 
Table 1: Filters, criteria and number of companies 
Filter Criteria Number of companies 
2003 2007 Common 
Country Portugal 84,236 332,743  
Accounting data Available  255,770  
Number of employees Min:     1  221,292  
Number of employees Max: 250  220,560  
Vol. of business Min:   1 euro  212,785  
Vol. of business Max: 50 million euro’s  212,527  
Total assets Min:     1  212,362  
Total assets Max: 43 million euro’s  211,970  
Banks All 22,556 109,164 16,607 
Ownership 100%   11,555 
Equity Positive   10,687 
SME Decree-Law 372/2007   7,672 
ROA; EVB Mean ± 3 x Standard deviation   7,414 
RO 2007 Positive   5,900 
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4.3. VARIABLES 
 
Based on the literature the indicators below were chosen to measure each of the relevant attributes for 
this study. 
 
The empirical work dedicated to studying corporate performance have highlighted that its 
quantification is carried out based on market information indicators or accounting information 
collected in the company. The population under study restricted the choice, limiting indicators to 
information made available by the company. 
 
The use of profitability indicators as an expression of corporate performance constitutes the support of 
a great deal of empirical work on this topic. Among these indicators the following what stands out is 
economic profitability of assets (ROA) (Pedersen and Thomsen, 2001; Wiwattanakang, 2001). 
  
Joh (2003) states the advantages of using ROA as a performance indicator. He argues that: i) existence 
of inefficient stock means that the share price does not reflect the totality of information available, ii) 
there is evidence that accounting profitability is more strongly associated with survival than Tobin’s 
Q, and iii) it allows performance of companies which are not listed on the stock market to be 
evaluated. 
 
ROA measures the company’s performance and reflects the profitability of the investments made. An 
advantage of this indicator stems from the fact that it is not influenced by capital structure as it does 
not include financial costs, expressing in good measure what the company does with its assets. Its 
analytical expression is given by the quotient of operating income (OI) and total assets (AT). 
 
Besides profitability, efficiency of volume of business (EVB) is referred to in a number of empirical 
works (Boubakri et al., 2005, D´Sousa and Nash, 2007) as a performance indicator assessed by 
volume of business per employee (Vol. Bus./Emp.). 
 
To measure the strength of the relationship bank the literature shows three indicators: duration, the 
number of banks and the amplitude of services rendered. Due to unavailability of data, only the first 
two are studied here. 
 
Duration is measured by the number of years which the company maintains a relationship with a credit 
institution. Given the difficulty in obtaining information on the duration of bank relationships, an 
alternative procedure was adopted which consists of indentifying the credit institutions with which 
each company maintained a relationship at distinct moments in time (2003 and 2007). If company i 
worked with credit institution A in 2003 and 2007, the relationship was assumed to have lasted 
throughout the entire period. With this assumption in mind, it is possible to assess the number of credit 
institutions with whom a relationship lasts at least four years and measure its relative importance. This 
indicator is expressed as the quotient of the number of banking institutions with which a relationship 
was maintained in the study period (from 2003 to 2007) and the number of institutions in 2007 
(Duration). 
 
The bond with the bank is also measured by the number of banking entities (No. of Banks) with which 
the company establishes relationships and may be classified as bilateral or multilateral. In considering 
the number of institutions that are part of the corporate relationship it is important to understand how 
the way the relationship evolves conditions performance. In this sense, bank relationships may be 
classified under three distinct categories: increasing (Rel. increase), maintaining (Rel. maintain) or 
decreasing (Rel. decrease). 
 
Under the company’s government, diverging interests between the stakeholders lead to developing 
regulating mechanisms of potential conflicts, ensuring that pursuit of interests is balanced and sustains 
the objectives based on the ownership structure and in the characteristics of the board of directors. The 
number of shareholders, their identity and concentration as well as internal ownership are all relevant 
11 
 
in the ownership structure dimension. As for the characteristics of the board of directors, importance is 
given to the number of board members and among these, those who by their nature are simultaneously 
shareholders.  
  
The size of the shareholder structure is given by the number of participants in the company’s equity 
(Shareholder size). Identity expresses how ownership is shared by the different interest groups: the 
family (Family), industry (Industrial), financial (Financial) and others (Others). Its value is expressed 
as a percentage, given by each one’s participation in the total equity. 
 
As a measure of concentration of ownership the Herfindahl index was adopted. It is calculated as the 
sumo f the squares of the participation of each shareholder in the company’s equity and varies between 
0 and 10,000, which is the situation when a sole shareholder has all of the equity (Concentration). 
 
Internal ownership refers to managers’ participation in the company’s equity. It is evaluated by the 
property held by whoever holds management positions in the company (Internal owner.). 
 
The characteristics of the board of directors are expressed by the number of directors (Size of Board) 
and by the number of shareholders who participate in this body (Nature of Board). 
 
The literature also allows us to identify a set of characteristics inherent to the company which are 
susceptible to condition the relationships under study. Among these let us highlight the following: the 
corporate dimension, reputation and debt. Among these control variables that have been shown by the 
literature, we always made sure the model did not include variables which are found a priori to be 
correlated by construction with the variable it is explaining. This concern led us to disregard some of 
the control variables that have been used in the literature. 
 
The corporate dimension is evaluated by a set of variables which enable us to classify companies as a 
function of a multi-criteria vector which aggregates the number of employees, volume of business and 
total assets. Decree-Law 372/2007 was adopted to base this work so as to group companies as micro 
(Micro), small (Small) and medium(Medium). 
 
According to Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) the company’s age reflects the reputation openly 
transmitted to the market. This plays a role which is distinct from the information that the financial 
intermediary acquires privately over the course of the relationship. In this sense, are emerges as an 
indicator of the company’s reputation and survival defined by the number of year since it was created 
(Reputation). 
 
The level of debt is a sign that is sent to the market on the nature of the company.  Among SMEs, 
taking into consideration the great limitations that they are subjected to in access to external funding, 
this indicator is an important differentiator at the corporate level. It reflects the company’s capacity to 
mobilize resources from different source. Despite the plethora of indicators used, we adopted the 
proxy which considers the relationship between total liabilities and equity (Financial Struct.). No less 
important is the weight of bank debt in the company’s liabilities determined by the quotient of bank 
liabilities and total liabilities (Bank Debt). 
 
 
5.  RESULTS 
 
Table 2 shows the results obtained from estimating the model with ROA and EVB as performance 
indicators. For the first 2.8% (Adjusted R Square) of the average variation, ROA is determined by the 
variables included in the model and for the second model, they explain 8.0% (Adjusted R Square).  
 
Another aim is to assess whether the different parameters of the models are different from zero. The t 
test reveals that for model 1 No. of Banks, Rel. Increase, Rel. Maintain, Size of Board, Micro, 
Reputation, Financial Struct. and Bank Debt have values that are significant for levels of significance 
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that are lower than 10%. These are determinant variables in the model. In model 2, for the same level 
of significance, the effects of the following variables are statistically different from zero in the variable 
to be explained: No. of Banks, Duration, Concentration, Size of Board, Small, Reputation and Bank 
Debt. 
 
Tab.2: Results of estimation 
 ROA (model 1) EVB (model 2) Colinearity 
Estimation Standardiz 
Coefficients 
Beta 
t Sig. Standardiz 
Coefficients
Beta 
t Sig. Tolera
nce 
VIF 
Constant         
No. of Banks -0,081 -4,994 0,000 0,097 6,206 0,000 0,633 1,579
Duration -0,017 -1,114 0,265 -0,050 -3,286 0,001 0,679 1,473
Rel. increase 0,047 2,178 0,029 -0,012 -0,565 0,572 0,355 2,815
Rel. maintain 0,048 2,414 0,016 -0,026 -1,340 0,180 0,414 2,416
Shareholder size -0,003 -0,157 0,875 0,024 1,194 0,233 0,394 2,536
Family 0,005 0,043 0,966 -0,007 -0,059 0,953 0,011 92,606
Industrial 0,052 0,449 0,654 0,108 0,947 0,344 0,012 82,653
Financial 0,001 0,025 0,980 0,024 0,637 0,524 0,107 9,337
Concentration 0,003 0,164 0,869 0,057 3,174 0,002 0,476 2,099
Internal owner. 0,020 0,749 0,454 -0,021 -0,802 0,422 0,230 4,356
Size of Board 0,035 1,754 0,079 0,046 2,396 0,017 0,418 2,394
Nature of Board -0,028 -1,001 0,317 0,018 0,672 0,501 0,207 4,826
Micro -0,064 -1,804 0,071 0,003 0,076 0,939 0,131 7,621
Small -0,008 -0,241 0,809 0,116 3,799 0,000 0,166 6,010
Reputation -0,058 -4,213 0,000 -0,049 -3,671 0,000 0,884 1,131
Financial Struct. -0,068 -5,243 0,000 -0,005 -0,394 0,693 0,990 1,010
Bank Debt  -0,095 -7,114 0,000 0,028 2,152 0,031 0,920 1,087
Adjusted R Square 0,028 0,080   
Durbin-Watson 1,952 1,955   
F 11,035 31,076   
Sig. 0,000 0,000   
 
The F test, which evaluates the model overall and not each of the parameters in isolation shows, that 
for a significance level of 1%,  the null hypothesis of the coefficients of the independent variables 
considered in each model is to be rejected. 
 
Through the Durbin-Watson test the existence of independence among the residual random variables 
is to analyzed. That is, its covariance is null, E (εi,εj ) = 0, i ≠ j. Since the value of the test 1.952 
(model 1) and 1.955 (model 2), approaches 2, we can conclude the non-existence of autocorrelation 
between the residuals. 
 
The linear regression model presupposes that the explanatory variables are linearly independent. That 
is, that multicolinearity is not found. The intensity of the multicolinearity may be analyzed through 
tolerance and VIF. Tolerance measures the degree to which a variable X is explained by all the other 
independent variables. Tolerance varies between zero and one. The closer it is to zero, the greater the 
multicolinearity. The value below which there is multicolinearity is usually considered to be 0.1. The 
inverse of tolerance is called VIF. The closer to zero VIF is, the lower the multicolinearity. The value 
usually considered to be the limit above which there is multicolinearity is 10. The values in Table 2 
show the possibility that this may be found among family and industrial ownership. 
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Table 2 shows that the No. of Banks is statistically significant in both models, but has opposite signs. 
The increase in the number of banks has a negative impact on ROA. This may be explained by the 
decrease in the incentive of the creditor bank(s) to monitor the company’s activities, thus duplicating 
the efforts of vigilance and control. Nevertheless, this relationship confers an information monopoly 
on the bank which can be used for their own benefit, conditioning the company’s investment 
decisions. For this reason, the impact this variable on EVB is revealed to be positive. Companies, 
anticipating hold-up problems have an incentive to establish multilateral bonds. In this sense, Thakor 
(1996) advocates that companies should establish multilateral relationships insofar as thusly they 
reduce problems associated with credit rationing. The work of Farinha and Santos (2002) focuses on 
the factors that determine the increase in banking relations for Portuguese companies and identify the 
reasons which make them replace bilateral relationships with multilateral ones, referring that: i) the 
companies with high income increase the number of bank relationships in order to minimize hold up 
costs, and ii) companies in financial trouble increase the number of bank relationships as a way of 
overcoming credit restriction imposed by the bank in the relationship. In a study on 426 micro and 
small companies in the central region of Portugal, Matias et al. (2009) conclude that higher 
concentration of credit in the lending bank presented a positive impact, generally speaking, in the 
terms of financing translating into lower interest rates and higher amounts of credit.. 
 
 
Duration of the bank relations is only for the EVB and exercises a negative effect. Matias et al. (2009) 
also say that a longer duration in the bank relationship does not bring benefits to companies in terms of 
improved credit conditions. The duration of the bank relationship only presents benefits in terms of 
lower demands of real guarantees and then only for smaller companies. It is not reflected in lower 
premiums on risk or higher limits on credit, so that the conclusion is that the relationship’s duration 
becomes irrelevant as an indicator of the solidness of the relationship. Hernandez and Martinez (2006) 
analyze the effect of bank relationships on bank debt for 184 small Spanish companies for year of 
1999. They used duration of the relationship and number of creditors as measures and conclude that 
the SMEs which interact with a smaller number of banks obtain funding at a lower cost. They also 
observe that financial institutions show a clear tendency to increase the demand for personal 
guarantees as the relationship progresses.  
 
The Rel. increase, Rel. maintain variables are significant to ROA. In the competitive market, banks 
have strong incentives to invest in the relationship for the negotiating power that results from the 
endogenous bond established with the company. It is evident that the larger the number of banks 
which hold information on the credibility of a company, the lower the value this information has for 
each of them. Consequently, companies who maintain or increase relationships incur lower hold-up 
costs, generating a posteriori a greater number of informed creditors which reduces each one’s 
incentive a priori to participate in the relationship. Freixas (2005) considers greater competition in the 
banking sector reduces the monitoring effort required for each relationship. He also analyzes the effect 
of the increase in competition over the availability and cost of credit, concluding that in less 
competitive markets the availability of funds decreases and interest rates increase. 
 
Concentration of ownership establishes a positive relationship with EVB. Empirical studies carried out 
do not allow definite conclusions to be drawn on the impact of concentration of ownership on 
performance because contradictory effects coexist. If on the one hand concentration of ownership 
allows greater supervision and na increased common benefit, on the other, it enables a reduced number 
of shareholders to obtain private benefits (Holderness, 2003; Thomsen, 2005). Although a number of 
authors advocate the development of legal mechanisms capable of promoting decentralized capital 
structures, others argue that ownership should remain centralized. With the aim of investigating this 
issue, Edward and Weichenrieder (2004) evaluate the positive/negative effects for the minority 
shareholder resulting from the presence of a majority shareholder for a set of 158 German companies. 
They say that the positive effects (common benefits increase as fruit of the reduction of principal-
agent problems) outweigh the negative effects (obtaining private benefits), so that concentration of 
ownership translates into a benefit for the minority shareholder.  
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The board of directors, as a vertex in the company’s internal control system, has one of the 
characteristics that make him a key element in the study of its governance. The number of directors is 
expressed by Size of Board. The values shown in Table 2 allow us to say that this variable has a 
positive relationship with ROA and EVB. Nevertheless, there is no unanimity in work that has been 
conducted regarding the influence of these variables on results. If a very significant set of papers (e.g. 
Wiblin and Wood, 1999; Andrés et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2001) say there is a positive relationship 
between size and results of value of the company. Others show there is a non-linear relationship, 
mentioning the size of the board exerts a positive effect on results up to a certain point, beyond which 
it has a neutral effect (Yermack, 1996) or even a negative one (Fernández et al. 1999). 
 
The size of the company, particularly smaller ones, Micro, are shown to be significant conditioning 
ROA negatively. The simultaneous performance of the owner and manager by an individual or family 
is associated with these companies. They are characterized by a reduced propensity for risk and a very 
careful analysis of investments made, which may condition their performance. Shareholders btaining 
benefits for their own advantages condition performance (Andres, 2008). 
 
The company’s age reflects public information on the Reputation and survival of the company. 
Regardless of what one would expect, the results show a negative relationship between this variable 
and performance. One possible reason relates to the fact that the age indicator is not the most 
appropriate one to measure this attribute. Whether the credit market assesses the company’s reputation 
based solely on its age cannot be confirmed. 
 
Corporate control may be exercised not only from the power conferred by ownership, but also through 
rights associated with external financing. The higher the debtor position, the greater the incentives for 
most banks to monitor corporate management. In turn, the control exercised by the bank over the 
company  will be greater, the greater the difficulty felt by the company in obtaining alternative 
resources. This translates into a negative relationship that the variables: i) Financial structure 
establishes with ROA and EVB and ii) Bank Debt with EVB. This is revealing of the negotiating 
difficulties on the part of the company. 
 
The results obtained validate hypothesis H11, showing a negative impact of the number of banks on. 
Duration of the bank relationship also shows itself to be a conditioning element on performance which 
means not rejecting hypothesis H12. 
 
As for the company’s government and in particular the ownership structure as a determinant of 
performance, as formulated in hypothesis H21, the values obtain do not appear to be significant. With 
regard to the characteristics of the board of directors, hypothesis H22, it is possible to say that they are 
determinant to corporate performance. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This work analyzes the influence bank relationships and corporate governance may have on corporate 
performance. 
 
The results suggest that a greater number of credit institutions and a longer lasting relationship have a 
negative impact on corporate performance. Maintaining or establishing new relationships have a 
positive relationship on ROA and negative on EVB. 
 
The characteristics of governance show that concentration of ownership conditions EVB positively and 
the size of the board has an equally positive effect on ROA and EVB.  
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Size as a determinant of corporate performance is relevant in micro-companies, particularly on 
operational profitability. The age of the company, financial structure and bank debt are also influent 
characteristics.  
 
The low R2 obtain in the models lead us towards further research. This should go both in the direction 
of trying to specify non-linear relationships between variables, and on the mediating effects that some 
variables – considered control variables in the model – may perform. In this regard, note, for example, 
the opposite effect to what the theory suggests between the variable “age” and the performance 
indicators. This contrary effect may be due to the fact that the “age” variable exercises a mediating 
effect and not a direct effect on performance as was considered in our model. In later work these 
aspects will be explored, without forgetting the need to carry out sectorial studies.  
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